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Based on the Maastricht treaty of 1992, the European Council has issued a ﬁrm commitment
towards an eastern enlargement of the European Union at the Copenhagen summit of 1993.
Within a short period of time it was faced with 10 membership applications from central and
eastern European countries (CEECs). The Luxembourg summit of December 1997 marks the
beginning of formal negotiations with a ﬁrst group of ﬁve CEECs. Two years later, following
the Helsinki summit of 1999, negotiations were extended to the remaining applicant countries
from CEE, plus Malta and Cyprus.1 The prime purpose of these negotiations is to assure a
complete adoption of all existing Union legislation (acquis communautaire) by future member
countries. But taking in as many as 12 new members requires signiﬁcant change also on the
part of the Union itself. In December 2000, at their summit in Nice, the EU15 heads of state
have agreed to enact an institutional reform aimed at a smooth and eﬃcient operation of an
EU27. Continuous progress notwithstanding, however, eastern enlargement continues to be a
hotly debated policy issue in virtually all present member countries. While the process appears
to be driven by political forces, economic considerations generate formidable stumbling blocks.
Much of the early discussion in EU15 countries has focused on the costs of enlargement. More
recently, as the negotiation agenda has reached the implications of the single market for labor
migration, labor market concerns in several incumbent countries give rise to additional strain in
the enlargement process.
Economists were quick to point out that integration of CEE goods and factor markets gives
rise to economic beneﬁts also to EU15 countries which tend to oﬀset the burden of increased
transfers to new member countries. But empirical analysis has revealed that the expected gains
are relatively small in size. Baldwin et al. (1997) have argued that the beneﬁts of enlargement are
of only minor importance for the EU15 as a whole, but mainly accrue to the Eastern accession
countries. This seems to justify a preoccupation with the ﬁscal burden, although we have
shown in a series of papers that in the case of Austria and Germany the integration gains are
suﬃciently large to overcompensate the ﬁscal burden [see Keuschnigg & Kohler (2002), Kohler
& Keuschnigg (2001), and Keuschnigg et al. 2001)].
Two important issues, however, remain for further scrutiny. First, in assuming continuous
labor market clearing, these early studies were probably too sanguine about employment. Given
1Throughout this paper, the term CEECs refers to 10 countries presently negotiating for EU membership.
The CEEC5s comprise the countries which have started negotiations already in 1998, often referred to as the
“Luxembourg group”, i.e. Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The CEEC10s additionally
include the “Helsinki-group”, i.e. Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and the Slovak Republic.
2widespread unemployment in Europe, the analysis of enlargement should appropriately include
potential eﬀects on unemployment by a more realistic treatment of labor markets. The second
issue relates to diﬀerences among EU15 countries. Obviously, the results obtained for Germany
and Austria cannot be assumed to hold for other countries as well. In countries at the western
and southern periphery, east-west market integration seems less important than the ﬁscal im-
plications of enlargement. Empirical studies should thus address more closely the likely eﬀects
on unemployment and wages of skilled and unskilled labor, and they should also compare the
diﬀerential eﬀects on countries located near the eastern border and on non-border countries like
Spain or the UK.
This paper takes up both of these issues, making a theoretical as well as an empirical contri-
bution. To address unemployment, we propose a search theoretic framework of job creation and
destruction which we combine with capital accumulation as a prime transmission mechanism
for integration eﬀects. We ﬁrst show analytically how enlargement is expected to aﬀect employ-
ment. Reﬂecting the general concern about unemployment eﬀects of demographic change and
population dynamics, we merge our search theoretic approach to the labor market with an over-
lapping generations model of household behavior. This turns out to be of particular relevance
for migration. Speciﬁcally, we shall demonstrate that immigration has important transitional
eﬀects on employment, depending on the age structure of migrants.
Turning to the empirical side, we implement a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium
model with exogenous trend growth of labor productivity. Calibration and numerical solutions
allow us to determine enlargement eﬀects for the German economy. The model in this paper
extends the basic model of Keuschnigg et al. (2001) by incorporating search unemployment,
separately for high- and low-skilled workers [see Heijdra and Keuschnigg (2000) for a more de-
tailed presentation]. This allows for a much richer treatment of enlargement eﬀects. Among
the eﬀects considered are capital accumulation, unemployment, the government budget, income
distribution, and overall welfare. The model allows to address an enlargement scenario focusing
on commodity market integration, budgetary eﬀects and, notably, immigration from applicant
countries. Finally, we extend the results obtained for the German case to all other EU15 coun-
tries, relying on a method that we have developed in Keuschnigg & Kohler (1996b).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 oﬀers a general description of the eastern
enlargement scenario, as it is perceived by present member countries. Section 3 introduces
the core elements of the model and develops key intuitive insights on how immigration and
market integration may aﬀect investment, unemployment and welfare in an open economy. To
this end, the appendix formally derives some analytical results. Section 4 deﬁnes the speciﬁc
enlargement scenario in quantitative terms and discusses simulation results from our CGE model
for Germany. Based on German model elasticities, section 5 approximates beneﬁts and costs of
3enlargement for other EU15 countries. Section 6 closes the paper with a summary and some
suggestions for future research.
2 Eastern Enlargement of the EU
While similar in terms of its quantitative signiﬁcance to the southern enlargement (Greece,
Spain and Portugal) in the 1980s, the upcoming eastern enlargement forms an unprecedented
challenge in ﬁve distinct ways. First, it involves countries which are still in transition to market
economies. This is reﬂected by special conditions for entry (stable democracies, competitive
market economies, adoption of the acquis communautaire), that have been made explicit at the
outset in the Copenhagen summit of 1993. Second, the income gaps to incumbent countries,
even after 10 years of transition, are still enormous. Enlargement is therefore likely to generate
severe strains, given the objective of regional convergence and coherence, which is a cornerstone
of the Union and draws 40 percent of its expenditure. Third, expected migration ﬂows are
larger than for the southern enlargement, unless restricted by policy. Overall, eastern European
countries are home to a well educated labor force. The income gaps do not reﬂect equal diﬀer-
ences in personal skills and human capital. In addition, geographic proximity and cultural ties
make for low “natural” migration barriers. Hence, some EU15 countries expect large inﬂows of
eastern European labor which might put their labor markets under severe pressure. A fourth
point relates to agriculture. The farming sector in some candidate countries is very large, and
productivity is often much below the EU15 level, more so than with southern enlargement of the
1980s.2 This has severe implications for the Common Agricultural Policy which aims to support
farm income and which draws another 40 percent of the EU budget. Finally, the number of
candidates is a problem of its own. EU institutions and rules of decision making have been
designed for a Union of 9 to 12 countries and are inappropriate for a 25-country Union. In the
Nice summit of 2000, despite much controversy over various speciﬁc proposals, the European
Council has succeeded to set the stage for a reform aimed at institutional structures which are
more appropriate for the enlarged Union.
For comparison, ﬁgure 1 takes a “snapshot-view” of previous and upcoming enlargements.
It looks at various groups of countries forming the European Union at diﬀerent stages of its
history, but always looking at 1995 data. Although the Helsinki summit of 1999 has started an
“open race” for all 10 applicant CEECs, we separate the Luxembourg group of CEEC5-countries
from the rest. In addition to population, the ﬁgure looks at GDP-per-capita (current exchange
2This is particularly true for Poland where the agricultural share of employment is about 25 percent and which
at the same time is by far the largest candidate country; see European Commission (1997) and ECOFIN (2001).
4rates and PPP), as well as the agricultural shares in employment and value-added. The ﬁgure
shows that, as it grew in size, the Union has almost steadily become a less wealthy and more
agricultural Union. Moreover, the income-gap involved in the eastern enlargement is clearly
enormous, compared with previous enlargements. On the other hand, the incremental eﬀect on
the share of agriculture is not without precedent. Notice, however, that the eﬀect is larger in
terms of employment share than in terms of the value-added share, reﬂecting a productivity
diﬀerence.3
Enlargement will aﬀect present member countries in at least three distinct ways. They will
ﬁnd themselves in larger integrated markets for goods and factors, they will have to shoulder
higher net contributions to the Union, and they will face a new institutional environment for
decision making and administration within the Union. In each of these dimensions, there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences among member countries.
Due to the Europe Agreements of the mid 1990s, non-agricultural trade between the EU15
and the CEECs is largely tariﬀ-free. Enlargement will do away with all remaining tariﬀ-barriers,
and it will extend the Customs Union as well as the EU Single Market (SM) to new members,
which will further enhance trade and factor movements. As always, this entails a mixture of
eﬃciency gains and painful adjustment. History and geography put present member countries
in rather diﬀerent positions with respect to these “gains and pains” from integrating eastern
European markets. Figure 2 highlights some of this variance by looking at the importance of
merchandize trade with the CEEC10-candidates for each of the EU15 countries. To allow for
a convenient comparison, we express all magnitudes relative to the corresponding value for the
EU15 as a whole, which we set equal to 100. Trade shares are in percent of GDP which gives a
more valid indicator for integration gains than the shares of trade with CEECs in overall trade;
see Kohler (2000a). Despite the signiﬁcant increase in east-west trade during the 1990s, trade
with CEECs is still of relatively minor importance for the total EU: 1997 exports to CEEC10s
were 1.08 percent of GDP (=100), the corresponding share for imports is a mere 0.79 percent
(=100). However, the cross-country variation is substantial. Thus, the export share for Portugal
is less than a ﬁfth of the EU-wide share, while the Austrian share is well over 3 times the EU15-
value. On the import side, the variation is similar, ranging from 0.16 percent for Ireland to
2.71 percent for Austria which is almost 4 times the EU-value. The diﬀerence between EU15-
countries in terms of these trade shares seems to persist as the level of east-west trade increases
3The productivity diﬀerence is probably larger than may appear from ﬁgure 1. ECOFIN (2001) emphasizes
that both labor productivity and output per unit of land are signiﬁcantly lower in the present applicant countries,
compared to EU15, than they were in Greece, Spain and Portugal, compared to EC9 prior to southern enlargement.
For a more detailed comparative account of the southern enlargement, see also European Integration Consortium
(EIC), 2001, Part B: Strategic Report.
5through time [see Kohler (2000b)].
For two reasons, it matters a lot whether a country is more heavily exposed on the export or
the import side. First, removal of formal barriers starts from a higher level for EU15 exports into
the CEECs than for its imports. Thus, pre-EA MFN tariﬀs on CEECs’ imports into the EU15
amounted to about 7 percent on average for all goods. In contrast, EU15 exports faced average
tariﬀs in some CEECs well above 10 percent, Poland leading with 15 percent [see European
Integration Consortium (2001)]. The second point relates to trade costs which also restricts
access to the SM, as opposed to pure distortions (tariﬀs and quantitative restrictions). Because
an extension of the SM involves a savings in real resources, the expected gains are much larger
than from removing pure distortions.4 A priori, the gains are more signiﬁcant on the import
than on the export side. Under perfect competition, there is a direct gain from cheaper imports,
whereas on the export side the gain comes about only indirectly through a terms-of-trade eﬀect
[see Kohler & Keuschnigg (2000)].
For both imports and exports, the expected gains (and pains) will be large if a country’s
trade is heavily concentrated in goods where barriers are high to start with, and vice versa.
Figure 2 therefore also looks at the signiﬁcance of trade barriers for each country’s trade with
the CEECs. We have constructed weighted average tariﬀ barriers, using each country’s bilateral
trade with the CEECs — again expressed in percent of that country’s GDP — as weights. We
do this on a the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System, which comprises over 5,000 diﬀerent
commodities, using post-Uruguay-round nominal MFN rates.5 For imports, we also calculate
a weighted average measure of non-tariﬀ barriers. Taking such structural details into account,
one observes that the diﬀerences across countries are somewhat less pronounced. The Austrian
measures of import barriers are down to 2.5 times the EU-level (from 3.5 for the simple trade
share), while for Ireland, Italy and Greece, they are higher than the simple trade shares. Figure
2, of course, gives no more than a quick overview of cross country diﬀerences in trade exposure
to eastern enlargement. A more systematic treatment of trade eﬀects requires a more ambitious
modeling eﬀort to which we turn below.
The diﬀerence between EU15 countries is even more pronounced when it comes to migration
which draws much attention in public discussions. It is generally assumed that Germany and
Austria will be the prime recipients of east-west migration. Based on recent estimates by the
European Integration Consortium (2001), ﬁgure 3 looks at the stocks of residents and employees
4Formally speaking, the eﬃciency gains are of ﬁrst-order (or rectangular eﬀects), rather than second-order (or
triangular eﬀects); see Kohler (2000a, 2000b).
5These tariﬀs have already been targeted by the Europe Agreements, but those agreements must be seen as
an integral part of eastern enlargement.
6from CEEC10-countries living in various EU15-countries, expressed in percent of the total stocks,
respectively, of residents and employees. The estimated number of persons from the CEEC10s
resident in Austria in 1998 is 1.27 percent of the Austrian population, almost double the German
ﬁgure (0.68 percent) which, in turn, is more than double the ﬁgure for Sweden and Finland
which are 0.30 and 0.23 percent, respectively [see European Integration Consortium (2001)].
The ratios are mostly smaller for employees than for residents, Luxembourg and Greece being
the only exceptions. These ﬁgures may be interpreted as rough indicators of the extent to which
countries are exposed to eastern enlargement on the labor market, and they clearly point to a
substantial variation among EU15-countries. Again, they give but a ﬁrst impression. A more
serious eﬀort at quantifying the magnitude and eﬀects of enlargement-induced migration will
follow below.
Present member countries will also be quite diﬀerently aﬀected by the costs of enlargement.
The overall cost may be estimated by looking at the ﬁnancial framework adopted at the Berlin
summit of 1999. Comparing the projected appropriations for payments to the CEEC5s with
the increase in own resources, and taking the ﬁnal year of the framework as the benchmark,
one obtains a total cost of 10,48 Bio Euro in constant 1999 prices, or 0.113 percent of EU15
GNP.6 However, this estimate suﬀers from uncertainty about the direct payments to eastern
farmers. The ﬁnancial framework assumes no such payments, but the issue has not been fully
settled yet in the ongoing negotiations. One should, therefore, regard the ﬁgure as a lower
bound. Assuming an extension of status quo policies, and relying on econometric models of EU
expenditure policy, we arrive at an alternative estimate of the cost which is higher and which one
may view as somewhat more realistic: 0.184 percent (0.370 percent) of EU15 GNP if the Union
is enlarged to CEEC5s (to all 10 CEECs).7 The resulting burden for an individual member
country depends on the strategy that the EU adopts in order to achieve a balanced budget.
6A c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁnancial framework, projected payments to new members increase through time, hence the
ﬁnal year is the most expensive one.
7The proposal recently submitted to the Council by the Commission is more optimistic than the Berlin 1999
framework as regards the year 2006. Commitment appropriations are projected at 15.966 Bio Euro, down from
16.780 Euro in the Berlin 1999 scenario (in 1999 prices). Payment appropriations are 11.840 Bio Euro, as compared
to 14.220 Euro in the Berlin scenario. However, the new framework treats 2006 as year 3 after enlargement, whereas
before it was the ﬁfth year after enlargement, which the Berlin summit has assumed to take place in 2002. This
is important because payments are assumed to be phased in only gradually. Comparing the new 2006 ﬁgures
with the Berlin 1999 ﬁgures for year 3 after enlargement, one ﬁnds an increase by 4.356 Bio (2.720 Bio) Euro
for commitment (payments) appropriations; see European Council (1999) and European Commission (2002). It
seems questionable whether one should treat the estimates for year 3 after enlargement as appropriate for our
calculations which are long-run in nature. Throughout this paper, we therefore stick to our initial estimate based
on ﬁgures for year 5 post-enlargement.
7Obviously, there are alternative strategies, and countries take opposite positions. In Kohler &
Keuschnigg (2000) we have presented the alternative ﬁscal burden resulting for each individual
member country if the EU would increase own resources or, alternatively, down-size the return
payments from Common Agricultural Policy, or cut European Regional and Structural Funds.
For instance, the more a country now receives from structural funds, the more severely it would
be hurt by a ﬁnancing strategy which heavily relies on adjustments of those funds. We shall
return to this question in a numerical way when we extend our empirical results for Germany
to other present member countries.
This quick overview clearly shows that eastern enlargement must be seen as a rather complex
policy scenario involving virtually all aspects of international market integration, in addition to
international transfer payments. Established theory of trade integration holds a presumption
of gains from trade, while migration theory similarly emphasizes a surplus for the immigration
country. From an incumbent country perspective, these need to be set against the expected
transfer burden, in order to see if enlargement holds a net gain. It seems rather obvious that
the issue can only be settled by looking at the channels of the various eﬀects in more detail
and, ultimately, by implementing empirical models for individual countries. Given the key
importance of labor market eﬀects, what we need is a reﬁned model which duly observes labor
market imperfections. We have developed such a model including a labor market characterized
by job creation, job destruction, and equilibrium search unemployment. The model is speciﬁcally
geared towards trade and migration eﬀects in a dynamic setting. We use a calibrated version to
quantify the eﬀects of enlargement on Germany below. We will then use the German results to
derive some rough approximations for the other present member countries. However, the next
section will ﬁrst use a skeletal version of our model to make the key transmission channels more
transparent and to build intuition for expected eﬀects on incumbent countries.
3A M o d e l B a s e d A n a l y s i s
3 . 1 M a i nT r a n s m i s s i o nC h a n n e l s
The main challenge in quantitative policy evaluation is to construct and empirically implement
a model which includes the necessary structural detail required by the speciﬁc policy scenario.
It must not miss any of the main channels for integration eﬀects which empirical and theoretical
work has recognized to be important. Since our focus is on present member countries, and in
particular on Germany, we apply a one country, open economy model which takes the world
interest rate as given. The model treats Germany as trading with other EU countries, eastern
candidate countries, and the rest of the world. Domestic consumption uses home goods, as
well as imports from these other regions. It can be viewed as a composite good C with a
8corresponding price index P as in equation (1) of Box 1. Investment I is similarly composed of
home produced and import goods. Taking foreign producer prices ¯ pm as given, a reduction in
tariﬀs and trading costs reduces domestic demand prices and, thus, boosts imports on account
of a substitution eﬀect.
The country is considered large on its export markets and can gain market shares with
more competitive prices. This is modeled in terms of regional export demand functions which
are downward sloping in export prices relative to foreign producer prices. However, German
exports are subject to foreign trade barriers. Obviously, if such protection on against German
exports disappears, the economy will experience an export boom. Our model thus captures the
familiar trade creation and trade diversion eﬀects stemming from EU enlargement. In addition,
it takes into account terms of trade eﬀects which are a further “classic” source of welfare gains
or losses from integration. With exports a function of relative prices, the terms of trade are
endogenously determined by market clearing, i.e. price pH must adjust to equate supply with
domestic and foreign demand for home produced goods. The strength of the terms of trade
eﬀect depends very importantly on the price elasticities of import and export demand which are
given by the “Armington substitution elasticities” relating to commodity demand.8
EU enlargement is widely expected to severely hit sensitive sectors such as paper, wood,
and textiles. A further sector surrounded by much anxiety is agriculture where the impact
of enlargement importantly depends on how the EU Common Agricultural Policy will treat
eastern farmers. In contrast, the more skill and technology intensive sectors should prosper on
account of enlarged export markets. Expecting a contraction in the low skilled sectors combined
with growth in skill intensive industries, economists and policy makers often predict unfavorable
distribution eﬀects on wages and employment of high and low skilled workers. How various
sectors are aﬀected, however, depends not only on the skill content of trade ﬂows, but also on
the particular sectoral pattern of tariﬀ and trade cost reductions, and on the extent of trade
exposure. It is by no means ruled out that enlargement favors some of the sectors intensive in
unskilled labor while trade with Eastern Europe is quantitatively less important for a number of
skill intensive sectors. In this case, the wage spread might not materialize and unskilled workers
might not be noticeably exposed. A meaningful study of these important issues must obviously
rely on a multisectoral model with diﬀerent skill groups. Our model is a useful tool to investigate
such distributional eﬀects, since it distinguishes twelve production sectors and two skill classes.
The labor market eﬀects of enlargement are a rather sensitive issue in present member
8The export demand functions can be rationalized in terms of preferences of foreigners similar to (1). If pref-
erences are the same across countries, the price elasticity of export demand must also be equal to the Armington
trade elasticity [see Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996a,b)].
9countries. With unemployment already high in Germany, particularly in eastern border regions,
the prospects of even higher unemployment resulting from structural adjustment is of great
concern to policy makers. While the link between trade and unemployment is not very obvious
to analysts, immigration from Eastern accession countries should have a more direct impact on
labor market equilibrium. It is thus important to include a rigorous modeling of the equilibrium
unemployment rate. Based on the theory of labor market search, our model solves, separately
for each skill class, for the equilibrium unemployment rate as the result of job creation and
destruction. It this way we can shed new light on these sensitive enlargement issues.
Policy makers in EU15 countries also hope for signiﬁcant growth eﬀects from enlargement.
It is clear from both theory and empirical evidence that integration and trade liberalization
importantly aﬀect investment and accumulation [see, for instance, Baldwin and Seghezza (1998)].
It is to be expected, therefore, that the investment channel will be an important factor to
shape the overall eﬀects of enlargement on present member countries. Our model is based
on neoclassical growth theory with savings and investment reﬂecting intertemporal trade-oﬀs
in consumption and production, and includes exogenous trend growth in labor productivity.
Starting from an equilibrium of balanced growth prior to enlargement, we compute the entire
trajectories starting from current initial conditions to a new long-run equilibrium. We can
thus distinguish between short- and long-run dynamic eﬀects. Investment serves not only as
a major engine of growth but is also a prime transmission channel to determine the eﬀects on
unemployment.
It has been estimated that EU enlargement imposes a considerable ﬁscal cost on present
member countries. Barring an increase in contribution payments, enlargement will require sav-
ings from lower spending on agricultural policy and structural funds. Being visible and easy to
comprehend, the expected ﬁscal costs are a contentious issue. On the other hand, if enlargement
holds prospects for stronger growth and stimulates the economies of Western Europe, then these
countries should reap an important ﬁscal dividend in terms of increased tax revenues. The op-
posite case is, however, equally relevant. A country in the south eastern periphery of the union
may not beneﬁt much from integration with central European countries but will nevertheless
have to share the ﬁscal burden. If enlargement is a negative shock to these countries, their tax
base will shrink and magnify the cost to the public budget. A balanced view will certainly have
to take account of such indirect eﬀects. As our model includes all the major taxes and spending
items, it allows to compute the size of a ﬁscal dividend if it exists.
Finally, the beneﬁts of European integration to a large extent stem from the creation of a
large common market which raises competition and allows ﬁrms to exploit economies of scale in
industrial production. The resulting cost and price reductions together with the pro-competitive
output gains are important sources of welfare gains from integration. The same logic now
10applies to Eastern enlargement. Only a model of imperfect competition and increasing returns
can capture such pro-competitive eﬀects. In our model, production is subject to monopolistic
competition with product diﬀerentiation and free entry and exit of ﬁrms. Producers derive proﬁt
margins by marking up prices over unit costs. In a free entry, zero proﬁt equilibrium, all proﬁts
are absorbed by ﬁxed production costs. With ﬁxed costs, ﬁrm size is well determined, and
increased market demand is satisﬁed by entry of new producers with diﬀerentiated products.
The introduction of new goods raises aggregate productivity and further magniﬁes the expansion
of industry.
3.2 Eﬀects on Present Member Countries
In putting together these transmission channels, we arrive at a model with rich economic struc-
ture that can address the important aspects of the policy scenario. It may seem diﬃcult,
however, to interpret the simulation results from such a complex model. Nevertheless, the main
logic can easily be stated in terms of a few equations as in box 1 where the model is collapsed
to a stylized one sector economy. The appendix derives more formally some basic comparative
static results. With unrestricted capital mobility, the interest rate r is mainly ﬁxed interna-




¯ pE of goods of eastern origin. Depending on the share of eastern capital
goods in domestic investment spending, import liberalization contributes to a lower price P of
the composite capital good. As the acquisition price of capital falls short of the present value
of the extra proﬁts in (5), producers start to invest in new equipment. Capital intensity will
eventually rise and thereby depress the marginal return to investment until new investment just
breaks even at the margin again.
The higher capital intensity raises labor productivity FL which, together with the lower
composite goods price, boosts the surplus RL f r o mj o bc r e a t i o ni n( 6 ) . D e p e n d i n go nt h e
outcome of wage negotiations, producers appropriate a job rent RL − W from new hiring while
the worker claims a wage W. To expand the workforce, ﬁrms must post vacancies and recruit in
the labor market. Depending on market tightness θ,t h eﬁrm is able to locate a suitable worker
with instantaneous probability q while it must otherwise continue to search. Such recruitment
activities are costly and require the ﬁrm to divert κ units of labor per vacancy from production.
The ensuing output loss is the opportunity cost of recruitment. When investing in an additional
vacancy, the ﬁrm thus compares the marginal cost of a vacancy, κRL, with the expected present
value of the producer rent RL −W that accrues, with probability q, once a worker is found and
production starts with the ﬁlled job, see (7). In raising the job surplus RL, integration inﬂates
the opportunity cost of recruitment but also strengthens the return to labor market search, i.e.
the expected present value of the producer rent.
11When wages are sticky because, for example, unemployment beneﬁts are kept constant in
real terms, the expected present value of producer rents increases more than proportionately.
For any given labor market tightness θ and a corresponding hiring probability q, it becomes
increasingly attractive to post more vacancies to expand the workforce. As ﬁrms need to ﬁll
more vacancies and accordingly expand recruitment, the labor market tightens which, in turn,
makes it increasingly diﬃcult to ﬁnd appropriate workers. The hiring probability falls, q0 (θ) < 0,
until the investment condition for vacancies is restored again in the new equilibrium. While bad
for ﬁrms, tight labor markets, of course, improve the prospects of the unemployed to ﬁnd a job,
f0 (θ) > 0. According to (2), for this reason, the outﬂow from unemployment starts to exceed the
inﬂows until, after some adjustment period, a lower equilibrium unemployment rate is attained.
The higher employment combines with higher capital intensity to considerably expand capital
accumulation and output, see (3) and (4) in Box 1.
So far, we have taken as given the prices of home produced goods, pH. It is not clear a priori
how they will change since the scenario holds a negative demand shock as domestic spending
shifts to imports, but also stimulates export demand. It turns out that our scenario holds more
potential on the export side and, thus, creates excess demand for home goods. In this case,
domestic producer prices must increase to bring about market clearing which will be veriﬁed in
the simulations below. Higher domestic prices directly boost the marginal return to investment.
On the other hand, they also raise the capital goods price P, but only less than proportionately,
since investment uses partly home goods but also import goods. According to (5), investment
incentives must further improve. Capital intensity picks up which, in turn, boosts job rents and
thereby induces ﬁrms to post more vacancies, see (6-7). Unemployment declines and output
expands. If, indeed, enlargement on average strengthens domestic producer prices, the supply
side expansion should be even more pronounced.
Imperfect competition introduces another important magniﬁer. With ﬁxed costs in produc-
tion and free entry of producers, the size of individual ﬁrms is well determined. An industry wide
expansion is then largely achieved by entry of new ﬁrms which introduce new diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts, rather than by output growth of existing ﬁrms. Therefore, the number of ﬁrms depends
on aggregate output, n(Y ), which, in turn, is related to factor endowments. A larger number n
of goods and services results in gains from specialization and reduces the cost of the composite
investment/consumption good, dP/dn < 0. By (5-7), such productivity gains stimulate invest-
ment and employment and thereby boost aggregate output Y as in (3). This output gain is again
brought about by new ﬁrms, n(Y ), which further raises productivity and stimulates even more
investment, employment and output. Monopolistic competition thus importantly magniﬁes the
12investment response.9
Finally, we can shortly explain the expected labor market eﬀects from immigration. In
the short-run, immigration must raise the unemployment rate by deﬁnition since the newly
arriving foreign workers must ﬁrst search in the labor market and will ﬁnd a job only after
some transitory search period. Given the fast labor market dynamics, the short-run increase
in unemployment should disappear rather quickly. In the long-run, increased labor supply
on account of a larger stock of immigrants fails to aﬀect equilibrium search unemployment.10
Immigration does not directly aﬀect the investment conditions in (5) and (7) for equipment
and job vacancies. In (2), the long-run unemployment rate is independent of the increased
labor force N. Both the number of employed and unemployed workers expand proportionately,
leaving the unemployment rate unchanged. Since the vacancy condition (7) is not aﬀected either,
equilibrium labor market tightness remains invariant as well. In the long-run, ﬁrms simply
expand the number of vacancies V in proportion to employment. According to (5), investment
accommodates the increased employment without any eﬀect on capital intensity. Output thus
e x p a n d sb yt h es a m ep r o p o r t i o n .I ft h e r ew e r en oi ncreasing returns, the adjustment mechanism
would be completed. If, however, the output gains lead mainly to entry of new ﬁrms and a larger
product variety n(Y ), the resulting gains from specialization will reduce the cost P of investment
goods and thereby strengthen investment incentives, see (5). Job rents should increase along
with higher capital intensity and trigger increased recruitment by ﬁrms. Via this channel,
immigration might well reduce the long-run unemployment rate, rather than increase it as much
of the popular opinion seems to believe.
B o x1 :M a i nT r a n s m i s s i o nC h a n n e l s
We distinguish four regions, Home, European Union, Eastern accession countries, and Rest
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where domestic prices of imports include tariﬀs and other trade barriers, pm =( 1 + τm)¯ pm.
Foreign producer prices ¯ pm are taken as given. P denotes the consumer price index which
depends not only on prices but also on product variety n, i.e. the number of diﬀerentiated






, that are downward sloping in the price of domestic exports, inclusive
of trading costs, relative to foreign prices.
9See Keuschnigg (1998) for a more detailed analysis.
10One might imagine, however, that institutional changes aﬀect workers’ bargaining power or mismatch in the
labor market increases. Both shocks would to some extent aﬀect the long-run unemployment rate.
13Savings and the level of consumption follow from maximization of life-time utility of over-
lapping generations of households, see the appendix. Savings and consumption thus respond to
interest rates and reﬂect the time proﬁle of expected future wage earnings. Disposable wage in-
come is an average over wages and unemployment beneﬁts and, thus, is low when unemployment
is widespread. Aggregate labor market ﬂows are
˙ Ut = Nt,t + sLt − (f (θt)+β)Ut, θt ≡ Vt/Ut. (2)
Inﬂows into the pool Ut of unemployed result from arrival of Nt,t new agents and job destruction
at rate s.T h eo u t ﬂow consists of unemployed workers ﬁnding a job at rate f (θt) or dying at
rate β. Absent immigration and with population constant, Lt + Ut = N. Given a birth rate
equal to the mortality rate β, the number of labor market entrants is Nt,t = βN which implies a
stationary unemployment rate U =( β + s)/(f (θ)+β + s). The unemployment rate is driven
by labor market tightness θ, measured by the ratio of vacancies V to job seekers U.







t = Lt − κVt. (3)
To ﬁll jobs, ﬁrms must post vacancies V and divert a part κV of the workforce to search and
recruitment activities, leaving only LD for production. New hiring is qV since only a fraction q
of vacancies can be ﬁlled at each instant. Hiring and investment I accumulate stocks by
˙ Lt = q(θt)Vt − (s + β)Lt, ˙ Kt = It − δKt, (4)
where δ is the rate of depreciation. Investment is also a composite of regional goods as in (1).
The hiring rate declines with equilibrium labor market tightness, q0 (θ) < 0.
Value maximization by ﬁrms determines optimal investment which equates the acquisition
cost of new capital P with the present value of marginal capital income,
¡
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where FK and FL are marginal factor products, tY the income tax rate, and r a ﬁxed interest
rate. Investment determines capital intensity and, in turn, the job surplus
RL = pHFL/P
¡
pH,p U,p E,p R;n
¢
. (6)
The investment condition for new vacancies equates the opportunity cost of recruitment, κRL,
and the expected present value of the ﬁrm’s net of tax job rent
¡
1 − tY ¢¡
RL − W
¢
,i . e .
¡
1 − tY ¢¡
RL − W
¢
r + β + s
· q(θ)=κRL. (7)
The ﬁrm posts vacancies until the marginal cost κRL of recruitment in terms of foregone output
equals the ﬁrm’s expected value of the vacancy which equals the probability q of ﬁnding a worker
times the expected present value of the job rent accruing to the ﬁrm. The instantaneous discount
rate reﬂects the risk of job termination due to death, β, and job separation for other reasons, s.
144 Simulations With a CGE Model: The German Case
While revealing important insights, analytical treatments based on stylized models leave open
the central question raised in section 2: Will the integration gains outweigh the ﬁscal burden?
Even though the central force behind enlargement is political in nature, whereby enlargement
should not be subject to net gains on the part of all incumbents, the process can be moved to
more solid ground if the public and policy makers are provided with quantitative measures of
key economic eﬀects. We therefore proceed to an empirical analysis based on a CGE model
of the German economy, extending the work of Keuschnigg et al. (2001). To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst multisectoral CGE model combining savings and investment with
search-unemployment in segmented labor markets for high and low skilled labor. Appendix A.7
describes the most important elements of the computational model and its calibration. We now
present the enlargement scenario as it enters the simulation model and then discuss the impact
of enlargement on Germany. In a subsequent section we broaden our focus to all EU15 countries.
In political terms, Germany is a staunch supporter of enlargement. At the same time, it is
seriously concerned about unwelcome economic eﬀects, particularly with respect to migration.
As we have seen in section 2, it is particularly exposed to new member countries from CEE on
both its commodity and labor markets. Thus its imports from CEECs in 1997 were 1.5 percent
of its GDP, second only to Austria which has a share of 2.7 percent. The corresponding ﬁgure
f o rG e r m a ne x p o r t st oC E E C 1 0 si s1 . 8 3p e r c e n t ,w h i c hi ss u r p a s s e do n l yb yF i n l a n dw i t h2 . 7 1
percent and Austria with 3.98 percent. While Germany is a particularly interesting case to
look at, these ﬁgures at the same time tell that even for Germany enlargement aﬀects only a
r e l a t i v e l ys m a l lf r a c t i o no fG D P .E x i s t i n gt r a d eﬂows thus constitute a low leverage for speciﬁc
measures of commodity market integration in the process of EU enlargement. One does not
expect overly strong integration eﬀects emanating from commodity markets. However, the same
is not necessarily true for labor markets. To proceed with a closer investigation of the German
c a s e ,w em u s tn o wd e s c r i b et h es p e c i ﬁc scenario that we address with our computational model.
4.1 The Scenario
In section 2 we have identiﬁed three diﬀerent components of an enlargement scenario: trade
integration, a ﬁscal burden from the cost of enlargement, and east-west migration. The trade
and ﬁscal aspects of our simulation scenario largely follow the pattern of Keuschnigg et al. (2001).
Table 1 summarizes the overall scenario which is best understood as being in four parts. The
ﬁrst element implements the Europe Agreements which removed non-agricultural tariﬀso nt r a d e
between the EU15 and CEEC10s. Removal of tariﬀs on EU15 imports has been put into eﬀect
in January 1997, while tariﬀs on CEECs’ imports will be completed in 2002. Strictly speaking,
15these agreements are not a matter of membership. In a broader sense, however, they must surely
be seen as an integral part of the enlargement project. For this reason we include them in our
simulation scenario. The next measure of trade integration removes of all remaining tariﬀsa n d
extends the Single Market in the event of enlargement by eliminating technical barriers and
other obstacles to market access. In line with other studies, we model this as a reduction in
real trading costs, and assume a 5 percent (ad-valorem) reduction of such costs on a sectoral
average.11 Our scenario restricts this to the Luxembourg group of CEEC5-countries. Although
these are the most promising CEE-candidates in the “Helsinki race”, recent events indicate that
the ﬁrst round of enlargement will include 8 CEECs (CEECs5 plus Latvia, Lithuania and the
Slovak Republic) plus Malta and Cyprus. All of these other countries are of minor importance,
however. It thus seems justiﬁed to restrict our attention to the CEEC5s only. Trade integration
also holds repercussions for EU15 farmers. In Keuschnigg et al. (2001) we argue that extending
the CAP price support system to new members is likely to increase import prices for eastern
farm products by 0.61 percent. For a similar reason subsidies on agricultural exports to CEECs
will be abolished. Finally, the CAP-induced supply response of eastern farmers is generally
expected to lower world farm prices. In line with Anderson & Tyers (1995), we assume a 2
percent price cut.12
The second component of our scenario captures the cost of enlargement. As detailed in
Kohler & Keuschnigg (2001), for any country the ﬁscal burden varies greatly, depending on
whether budget balance in an enlarged Union is achieved through an increase in contribution
payments, a cut in CAP return ﬂows, or by downsizing the ESF. Moreover, an econometric
model of EU expenditure yields a somewhat higher overall cost of enlargement than the oﬃcial
ﬁnancial framework of the Union adopted at the Berlin summit in 1999. Our scenario includes an
overall cost of 0.184 percent of EU15 GDP and assumes that the budget will be closed by a cut
in ESF payments. In this case, a CEEC5 enlargement implies that Germany’s net contribution
payments to the Union rise from 0.595% of its GDP to 0.665%.13
The third and fourth components of the scenario turn to migration. Estimating migration
ﬂows from CEECs to the EU15 countries is notoriously diﬃcult. We make use of a recent study
by the European Integration Consortium (EIC, 2001) in order to derive a migration scenario
that is amenable to our simulation model. To make full use of our model which features a
11This is considerably less optimistic than the 10 percent assumed by Baldwin et al. (1997).
12Our scenario reasonably assumes that the EU will not raise its variable import levies and export subsidies to
protect its farmers against this erosion of world market prices. Keuschnigg et al. (2001) oﬀer more detail on CAP
eﬀects of enlargement.
13In Keuschnigg et al. (2001), we have used the more optimistic Commission estimate in which case the net
contribution increases only to 0.645%.
16distinction between skilled and unskilled labor, we use additional information to arrive at a
scenario which duly recognizes that distinction. The EIC baseline projections imply an overall
increase in German residents from CEEC10s from some 550 thousand in 1998 to about 2.5 Mio
people by 2030. Assuming in line with EIC that 35 percent of these residents will enter the
German labor force, we arrive at a long-run increase of the skilled and unskilled labor force by
0.84% and 6.15%, respectively. The details of our procedure can be found in appendix A.7.14
Formally, the migration scenarios add the accumulated migration inﬂows to the initial stocks
to obtain the new steady state levels of skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. In line with
migration theory and EIC projections, we assume, instead of an instantaneous stock adjustment,
that migration inﬂows accumulate over time and augment stocks gradually.
4.2 Results
Due to its complexity, the enlargement scenario in its entirety is ambiguous a priori. The
abolition of trade barriers tends to expand the economy, while higher net transfers to the EU
are contractionary [see Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996a,b)]. Our results indicate that the mutual
trade liberalization and improved market access clearly dominate the picture. The supply and
demand reactions following enlargement are easily pointed out. Despite of a rather more complex
economic structure, the numerical results largely conﬁrm the basic insights of the analytical
insights of section 3 and the appendix. The base case scenario keeps real unemployment beneﬁts
and tax allowance constant. Table 2 separately presents the long-run (steady state) eﬀects for
the trade and ﬁscal scenarios in columns 1 and 2, while column 3 depicts the joint eﬀect of both.
The interpretation of column 3 (Enl) runs as follows.
Real Beneﬁts Constant: Cheaper capital and intermediate goods improve supply conditions.
In addition, demand favors imports of eastern origin, hence there is downward pressure on
domestic producer prices. At the same time, the mutual elimination of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ
barriers boosts demand for German exports to the CEECs. Indeed, the scenario entails a
slightly more powerful leverage on the export side, due to higher tariﬀsi nC E E C st h a ni nt h e
EU [see above]. To restore equilibrium, domestic producer prices increase on average, although
the eﬀect is rather small compared to the reduction in price indices on account of lower protection
rates.15 German exports to CEECs expand by about 57%. Higher prices reinforce the supply
14Reﬁned estimations by Sinn et al. (2001) lead to higher immigration ﬂows, see also Sinn & Werding (2001).
We use the EIC estimates because they extend to other EU15 countries, as we require in section 5.
15The large terms of trade gains vis-à-vis the CEEC5s (7%) are due to the fact that vanishing trade costs are
direct equivalents to a terms of trade improvement. Since cheaper imports reﬂect savings in resource use on the
17side expansion by strengthening investment incentives, whence the economy experiences an
investment led expansion with capital stocks accumulating by 0.63%. The increase in capital
intensity strengthens marginal rents to job creation and tightens labor markets, leading to a
small reduction in unemployment in the base case where real unemployment beneﬁts are kept
constant. The reduction in the unemployment rate is slightly larger for unskilled workers, albeit
from a higher initial rate. With a total benchmark labor force of 40 million, the reduction in the
average unemployment rate corresponds to 28.000 new jobs. While the gains in employment are
relatively minor, workers beneﬁt from higher wages. Wages of skilled workers, deﬂated by the
consumer price index, are up by 0.92% in real terms. Notice that in the German case, unlike
the Austrian, goods market integration contributes to a slightly wider wage spread.16
The output expansion largely occurs via ﬁrm entry and thus contributes to productivity
gains due to specialization and diversiﬁcation of industrial production. Such productivity gains
translate into lower price indices which further stimulate investment and other ﬁnal demand,
thereby magnifying the gains in output and real income. Real GDP, deﬂated by the consumer
price index, is up by 0.67%. We capture the government budget eﬀect by assuming that the
government passes on the ﬁscal burden of enlargement to households by cutting transfer pay-
ments. At the same time, however, the overall expansion swells the tax bases which, for given
rates, boosts revenues from both direct and indirect taxes. This revenue eﬀe c ti nt h ee n da l l o w s
for a remarkable increase in transfers to households other than unemployment beneﬁts (0.52%,
or 0.82% in real terms). The ﬁscal returns from enlargement are, thus, more than enough to pay
for the increase in net contributions. Wage growth, lower unemployment and higher transfers
all boost average disposable wage income which is up by 0.85% in real terms. By construction of
the model, this is exactly mirrored by a corresponding increase in consumption in the long-run.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Table 2 reveals that the goods market implications of
enlargement promise aggregate welfare gains which more than oﬀset the ﬁscal cost of enlarge-
ment. The net eﬀect is measured by a Hicksian equivalent variation of almost half a percent of
German GDP.17
part of eastern suppliers, there is no oﬀsetting terms-of-trade loss for the east!
16The eﬀect on the wage spread is understood only by investigating in more detail the structural eﬀects of
enlargement, see Keuschnigg et al. (2001). For the Austrian case, see Keuschnigg & Kohler (2002) and Kohler &
Keuschnigg (2001).
17We compute the equivalent variations of life-time wealth for each cohort and sum them over present and future
generations with due discounting and weighing by cohort size. For comparison with annual GDP, we convert the
resulting wealth measure into an annuity by multiplying with the interest rate.
18Alternative Fiscal Policy Assumptions: In discussing Proposition 1 of appendix section
A.6, we argued that integration should no longer aﬀect unemployment when unemployment
beneﬁts as well as tax allowances are fully indexed to net wages. As a theoretical possibility we
noted that unemployment rates may even increase when unemployment beneﬁts are indexed but
wage tax allowances are kept constant in real terms. Before turning to the migration scenarios
in columns 4 through 6 of Table 2, we numerically investigate the role of domestic ﬁscal policy
rules in determining how unemployment responds. Column 1 of Table 3 repeats ‘Enl’ from the
previous table. Column 2 depicts the case where both unemployment beneﬁts and basic tax
allowance are indexed to net of tax wages. In this case, wages are fully ﬂexible and integration
remains without consequences for labor market tightness and unemployment. The diﬀerence in
other variables is hardly discernible, except for government transfers which are roughly halved,
since indexation requires an increase in unemployment beneﬁts in face of higher wages. For
this reason, the gains in average disposable wage income and consumption are somewhat lower.
Moreover, the welfare gain is partially eroded, since the shock is now less expansionary which
tends to subdue the gains from specialization and induced capital accumulation.
Next, we re-calibrated the model to allow for a more progressive wage tax with higher
marginal tax rates which combine with a larger personal allowance to replicate the data on
tax revenues. Then we repeated the enlargement shock, keeping the real value of the basic
tax allowance constant while introducing indexation of unemployment beneﬁts. As anticipated
i na p p e n d i xs e c t i o nA . 6 ,w eﬁnd in column 3 that unemployment rates (slightly) increase in
response to the enlargement shock. Column 4 of table 3 again turns to the base case scenario
where beneﬁts and the tax allowance are kept constant in real terms. In addition, we now keep
constant real household sector transfers as well (which decline along with the consumer price
index by -0.32%) and, instead, adjust the wage tax to ﬁnance the government budget. The
expansionary nature of EU enlargement swells the tax bases and yields a considerable ﬁscal
dividend which allows for a reduction in the marginal wage tax rate by about one percentage
point. The lower tax burden on labor reinforces the eﬀects of integration and further squeezes
unemployment. Compared to the base case scenario in the ﬁrst column of Table 3, the reduction
in the unemployment rate is now more than double, creating employment for about 63.000
people.
Immigration: Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 turn to immigration of low-skilled and high-skilled
workers separately, while column 6 depicts the joint immigration scenario. The eﬀects reported
in column 6 are anticipated in Proposition 3 of appendix section A.6. In an open economy
with a constant real interest rate, immigration doesn’t hold any direct incentives to adjust
capital intensity. The increase in manpower is largely accommodated by investment to hold
the capital labor ratio constant. Consequently, immigration translates into an equally large
19output expansion. In the presence of a monopolistically competitive market structure with
endogenous diversiﬁcation, however, the output gains come in the form of increased ﬁrm entry,
resulting in more specialized production techniques. The gains from diversiﬁcation squeeze
price indices which makes investment goods cheaper and contributes to higher capital intensity
and labor rentals. With constant real beneﬁts, higher labor rentals increase job values by
more than wages, encouraging ﬁrms to post more vacancies. Tightening labor markets would
eventually reduce unemployment rates in both skill groups if immigration had no skill bias.
Since immigration is concentrated in the low skilled segment, however, we ﬁnd that only the high
skilled experience a lower unemployment rate while unemployment among low skilled workers
becomes more widespread. Due to the size of the shock, the eﬀects are much stronger than in
the base scenario of column 3. It must be emphasized that the welfare gains in the migration
scenario relate only to the domestic population and correspond to what migration theory calls
the “immigration surplus”.
Columns 4 and 5 of table 2 point to strong distributional eﬀects when immigration is con-
centrated in the low-skilled sector, or in high-skilled sector of the labor market. The diﬀerential
eﬀect of unskilled immigration on the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers is more than
half a percentage point, while at the same time the wage rate of those employed falls by more
than 4 percent! Skilled workers, in contrast, beneﬁt from a 1.17 percent wage increase (almost
2% in real terms), while their unemployment rate at the same time falls by one tenth of a per-
centage point. Most of the shock thus translates into wages rather than (un-)employment. A
particularly noteworthy feature of the two separate scenarios of columns 4 and 5 is the following.
Immigration of low-skilled workers lowers unemployment for skilled, while raising it for unskilled
labor, as expected. But high-skilled immigration lowers unemployment for both types of labor.
This might be due to the fact that skilled labor is complementary to capital, in which case
immigration causes a marked expansion of the capital stock. Indeed, the capital stock increases
by more than 1 percent in column 5, almost as much as with unskilled migration, although the
inﬂow is much lower in magnitude than for unskilled labor [see above].
Figures 4a-b compare the transitional eﬀects on group speciﬁc unemployment rates for the
two diﬀerential migration scenarios, the stock and ﬂow approaches. The ﬂow approach assumes
a permanently higher arrival rate of new generations at home. The resulting adjustment process
is smooth, but extends over several decades until the stationary population is attained. The
stock approach, in contrast, assumes that immigration inﬂates all age cohorts proportionately
without any extended demographic eﬀects. Since all migrants ﬁnd employment only by searching
in the labor market, the unemployment rate shoots up instantaneously to more than double its
initial value. Due to the very fast labor market dynamics, however, the long-run unemployment
rate of about 10.5% is approximately attained within a few quarters.
20Sensitivity: As in any economy wide model, results are sensitive to some extent to para-
meter variation. Although the number of parameters in a detailed empirical model is large,
comparative static analysis based on stylized versions of the model, as well as previous expe-
rience with simulation work, narrow down the set of sensitive parameters quite considerably.
Rather than adding more simulations, we may therefore refer the reader to our earlier work
for a more detailed treatment of the sensitivityi s s u e . G e n e r a l l y ,w ec a ni d e n t i f yt w os o u r c e s
of sensitivity. One is in the choice of some key behavioral parameters, and the other is in the
speciﬁcation of the policy scenario. In Keuschnigg et al. (2001) we have found that scaling
down the Armington trade elasticities by a factor of 0.8 reduces the aggregate welfare gains by
af o u r t h . 18 Of course, an increase in these elasticities would yield a considerably more positive
picture, see also Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996b). A further important feature of our model is
increasing returns due to monopolistic competition. The key parameter here is the elasticity of
substitution among diﬀerentiated varieties of a product, the so-called Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity. A
larger elasticity makes the perceived demand curve of individual producers more price elastic
and reduces market power. Furthermore, the external productivity gains from specialization in
production become smaller. Such productivity gains act as important magniﬁers. Not surpris-
ingly, we ﬁnd that doubling the elasticity as compared to the base case reduces welfare gains by
a third. Finally, Heijdra and Keuschnigg (2000) have found that the comparative static eﬀects
of enlargement are not very sensitive to variations in the matching elasticity and the bargaining
power of workers, even though these are key parameters in determining the overall unemploy-
ment rate. Overall, we may conclude that the qualitative results are very unlikely to be turned
around if we re-calibrate the model with rather diﬀerent parameter values.
Very important, but often neglected, is the sensitivity of results with respect to particular
assumptions included in the policy scenario. The size of real trade cost reductions are subject
of much debate. We have chosen rather conservative estimates, i.e. a 5 percent reduction on
average as compared to 10 percent in Baldwin et al. (1997). As evidenced by Table 2, the
reduction in real trade cost clearly dominates the overall picture. Our results would be much
more beneﬁcial, for instance, if we were to follow the more optimistic assumptions taken in
Baldwin et al. (1997). Finally, Table 3 points to the importance of domestic ﬁscal policy rules in
determining the impact of enlargement. Complete indexation of unemployment beneﬁts would
eliminate the eﬀects on unemployment. On the other hand, if real beneﬁts were kept constant
and the revenue proceeds used to reduce the wage tax instead of cutting neutral transfers to
18The Armington elasticities directly aﬀect the power with which the trade shock is transmitted to the home
economy. Lower values make import and export demand less price elastic which magniﬁes the relative price
changes but dampens the quantity response.
21households, the beneﬁcial eﬀect would be considerably magniﬁed.
5 Implications for Other Member Countries
Germany is but a special case. It is important to also look at other countries, duly taking into
account how they diﬀer from Germany in terms of enlargement-related characteristics. Follow-
ing an approach that we have developed in Keuschnigg & Kohler (1996b), we therefore venture
to extend the above results to other incumbent countries. To do so, we use the results obtained
above in order to derive key elasticities with respect to certain elements of the enlargement
scenario that can be applied to other countries, given suﬃcient scenario details pertaining to
these countries. We focus on the four scenario components highlighted by table 1: Trade in-
tegration (scenario I), the ﬁscal burden arising from budgetary implications (scenario II) , and
immigration from new member countries, separating low-skilled labor (scenario III) from skilled
labor (scenario IV). We thus require country-speciﬁc details on each of these aspects.
The key idea is that the magnitude of the enlargement shock diﬀe r sa c r o s sp r e s e n tm e m -
ber countries because they diﬀer (a) in their volume and composition of trade with accession
countries, (b) in their likely share of the ﬁscal burden that is allocated to them, and (c) in the
number of immigrants they are likely to attract. Once we have constructed measures for the size
of country-speciﬁc enlargement shocks, including Germany, we ﬁrst take the results (for welfare,
say) from our computational model to calculate elasticities with respect to these shocks, and
then apply these elasticities to other countries’ enlargement shocks. Admittedly, this yields but
a rough approximation, but barring detailed computational models for all 15 incumbents it is
certainly a very useful and informative exercise.
The approach is best described by means of direct reference to table 4 which presents welfare
results, but it can easily be applied to any other variable of interest. In Table 2, we decompose
the overall scenario into its relevant components. Columns 1 through 4 of Table 4 correspond to
columns 1-2 and 4-5 of Table 2. Consider ﬁrst the trade component of our scenario. Integration of
commodity markets has diﬀerent eﬀects for each of the EU15 countries, depending on how much
they trade with accession countries, but also on the detailed patterns of this trade. Thus, for
some EU15 countries trade with CEECs may be focused on goods where barriers are particularly
large prior to eastern enlargement, while trade of other incumbents may be concentrated in goods
with relatively low barriers. This holds true for tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers, and it applies
independently to exports and imports of each country. An adequate measure of the country-
speciﬁc size of the enlargement-induced trade-shock needs to take all of this into account. We
rely on Kohler (2000a) where several theory-based measures of this kind are presented for all
EU15 countries. These are constructed from weighted averages of tariﬀ- and non-tariﬀ barriers,
22u s i n ge a c hc o u n t r y ’ st r a d ew i t hC E E C s ,e x p r e s s e da ss h a r e si ni t so w nG D P ,a sw e i g h t s .T h i si s
done independently for both imports and exports, based on the 6-digit level of the Harmonized
System (HS) which comprises over 5,000 diﬀerent commodities. To obtain a more comprehensive
measure, such averages are then combined with indices which capture the possibility of trade
diversion.19
The ﬁrst column of Table 4 reports the country-speciﬁc trade shock in terms of a composite
index of trade exposure to CEECs (see previous footnote). For Germany, the index value is
0.397. At the same time, column 1 Table 2 reports from our computational model that the
German welfare gain from enlargement-induced trade integration is 0.554 percent of GDP. This
implies an elasticity value of 1.394 = 0.554/0.397, which is reported in the last line of Table
4. To obtain an estimate for the corresponding welfare gain for France, we take this elasticity
value and multiply it with the size of the French trade shock which according to our composite
measure is 0.103. The result is a welfare gain in the amount of 0.143 (=0 .103 × 1.394) percent
of GDP. The implications for other incumbent countries are calculated in the same way. To
save space, Table 4 does not report these values for each component of our scenario. Instead,
we list the country-speciﬁc shocks for all three remaining elements of the enlargement scenario,
reporting the net welfare eﬀect in the ﬁnal column.
The German model elasticities for other scenario elements are derived in a similar way. For
instance, column 2 of Table 4 reports the size of the ﬁscal burden from the budgetary cost of
eastern enlargement to the EU15. We rely on an econometric model of EU expenditure policy
which explains return ﬂows through CAP as well as European structural and regional funds
(ESF), in terms of receiving countries’ economic characteristics, see Breuss (1995).20 Based on
the estimated coeﬃcients of this model, the relevant economic variables of the CEECs yield
an estimate of CAP and ESF expenditure to be allocated to new members. Subtracting the
CEECs’ own resources, we arrive at the cost of enlargement that EU15 countries have to share,
either by increasing own resources, or by downsizing CAP or ESF spending. Our calculations




iti,w h e r eti is the common external
tariﬀ in commodity i,a n dµ
j
i denotes commodity-i-imports from CEECs into country j,e x p r e s s e da sas h a r ei n
country j’s GDP. Analogous calculations are made for non-tariﬀ barriers, and for exports to CEECs. The data
source is the OECD International Trade by Commodity Statistics (ITCS) data bank (on CD-DOM), and the
corresponding OECD Indicators of Tariﬀ and Non-tariﬀ Barriers (on CD-ROM), as well as Finger et al. (1996).
In terms of the notation used in Kohler (2000a), the overall measure used and reported in table 4 is composed of
the indices ¯ T
j
O + ¯ K
j
O + ¯ N
j
O + ¯ X
j. There is no immediate interpretation of this composite index, but this does not
in any way harm its use in the approach described above. Notice also that the index is more comprehensive than
the measures underlying Figure 2 above.
20The resulting cost estimate is somewhat higher than the Commission estimate evidenced in the ﬁnancial
framework for 1999-2000 [see Kohler & Keuschnigg (2000)].
23are based on the assumption that the enlarged Union will cut its ESF spending to balance the
budget.21 The resulting ﬁscal burden for each of the EU15 countries is expressed in percent of
its GDP which is reported in column 2 of Table 4. For Germany, we have a ﬁscal burden equal
to 0.07 percent of GDP (see also Table 1). Table 2 reports a welfare loss from this burden in the
amount of 0.091 percent of GDP. This corresponds to an elasticity of 1.309 = 0.091/0.070 which
is again found in the last line of Table 4. Since Portugal would lose ESF return ﬂows worth
1.025 percent of its GDP under this scenario, it would sugger a welfare loss equal to −1.342
(= −1.025 × 1.309) percent of GDP.
As regards enlargement-induced migration, we rely on estimates reported by the European
Integration Consortium (2001) to obtain expected immigration ﬂows for all EU15 countries.
Given our model focus on skilled versus unskilled labor, we aim at a corresponding breakdown
of migration ﬂows. Relating the projected skilled and unskilled migration inﬂows to the receiving
country’s skilled and unskilled labor force, respectively, we arrive at estimates of the skill-speciﬁc
migration shocks as reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. Details of the underlying procedure
can be found in the appendix. For Germany, the estimates imply that the unskilled labor
force increases by 6.152 percent, while immigration swells skilled labor supply by 0.840 percent.
Comparing with columns 4 and 5 of Table 2, we obtain welfare elasticities of 0.058 = 0.357/6.2
for immigration of low skilled labor, and 0.399 = 0.335/0.840 for high skilled immigration. These
elasticities are again reported in the last line of Table 4. Applying these to expected Spanish
immigration ﬂows, for instance, the welfare eﬀects from low skilled immigration into Spain is
0.018 (=0 .312 × 0.058), and for skilled migration it is 0.015 (=0 .037 × 0.399).
Finally, we arrive at the total welfare eﬀect of a speciﬁc country by summing up the elasticities
reported in the last line multiplied with the corresponding shock components as reported in
columns 1 to 4 of Table 4. Thus, for Germany, we calculate an overall welfare eﬀect of 1.151 =
0.397 × 1.394 − 0.070 × 1.309 + 6.200 × 0.057 + 0.800 × 0.419 p e r c e n to fG D P .N o t et h a tt h e
ﬁrst two parts of this sum give a welfare increase of 0.462 percent of GDP,22 while immigration
overall results in a combined welfare eﬀect of 0.689 percent.
Figure 5 visualizes the overall welfare impact of present member countries and also relates it
to the separate sources of gains or losses. A comparison with other countries reveals a great deal
of variation and reveals the conﬂi c to fi n t e r e s tt h a tw eh a v ea l l u d e dt oa b o v e .T h ew e l f a r eg a i n
21For more details and alternative calculations, see the appendix to Keuschnigg & Kohler (1999), as well as
Kohler & Keuschnigg (2000).
22The diﬀerence between this ﬁgure and the welfare eﬀect in column 3 of Table 2 is due to the nonlinear nature
of the computational model. Fully solving the computational model is bound to generate results which are not
directly reproduced by simply adding the elasticity-based sub-results.
24from trade integration comes close to 1 percent of GDP for Austria and exceeds half a percent for
Germany and Finland, while being almost negligible for Portugal and Spain. Trade integration
with CEECs is expansionary for all countries, but again only marginally so for countries which
are less exposed to the east. The ﬁscal implications from the cost of enlargement are also quite
uneven across present member countries. Speciﬁcally, when the budget of the Union is balanced
through ESF cuts, several countries must shoulder a large burden, although they stand to beneﬁt
only well below average from integration gains. Notice that the welfare elasticity is larger than
one, i.e. the welfare loss of a country is higher than its share in the ﬁscal burden. The general
equilibrium repercussions make net outward transfers a contractionary “policy” for the domestic
economy.
Country diﬀerences are most pronounced when it comes to migration.A c c o r d i n gt ot h eE I C
(2001) estimates, accumulated migration inﬂows vary from almost nil in countries like Spain and
Portugal to as much 10 percent for unskilled labor in Austria, or 6 percent in Germany. From a
policy perspective, a notable feature of the immigration scenario is that it yields both negative
and positive eﬀects. On the one hand, Table 4 points to a sizable welfare gain that immigration
yields to the domestic population of the receiving country — the familiar “immigration surplus”.
On the other hand, immigration of low-skilled labor does contribute to domestic unemployment
as we discussed in the case of Germany. Note again, however, that high-skilled immigration is
diﬀerent in that, in fact, it lowers unemployment for both types of labor; see Table 2 above.
The approach is easily extended to other variables of interest. Thus, for the trade scenario
table 2 reports an increase in government revenues (measured by a notional increase in lump-
sum transfers to domestic households) of 1.167 percent which yields a revenue elasticity equal
to 2.936 = 1.167/0.397. Assuming somewhat heroically that the Spanish ﬁscal structure is
reasonably similar to the German one, we would calculate that the expansionary trade shock
would boost Spanish government revenue by 0.168 (=0 .057 × 2.936) percent. This is low
compared to the German estimate, since Spain is trading only to a minor extent with CEECs
and, therefore, cannot be stimulated very much by trade integration. For shortage of space,
we do not report any results other than the overall welfare eﬀects reported in Table 4. The
reader may compute any result of interest by relying on the country-speciﬁcs h o c k sr e p o r t e di n
Table 4, in combination with Table 2 which reports the results from our computational model
for Germany. 23
23A more comprehensive table of results may be obtained upon request.
256C o n c l u s i o n s
Employment eﬀects of an eastern EU enlargement are a big concern to politicians and the
general public of present member countries, particularly now that membership negotiations
have reached the highly controversial issue of labor movements. Existing studies of enlargement
eﬀects do not suﬃciently accommodate this concern. The purpose of this paper was to provide a
uniﬁed general equilibrium framework for investigating employment eﬀects, alongside the trade
integration eﬀects and the costs of enlargement. Our contribution is twofold. First, we have
derived key intuitive insights into how trade integration and immigration aﬀect domestic labor
markets. Our arguments rest on a stylized theoretical model that combines a search theoretic
explanation of unemployment with capital accumulation and household dynamics. We have paid
due attention to the fact that ﬁscal policy rules pertaining to unemployment and wage taxation
are important in determining how enlargement can aﬀect unemployment. And secondly, we
have empirically implemented an enriched version of such a model by means of calibration
techniques. Simulations of the model allowed to trace in quite some detail the potential eﬀects
of EU enlargement on the German economy. Finally, we introduced a method of extending our
empirical results also to other EU15 countries.
We found, both theoretically and empirically, that the labor market eﬀects of trade integra-
tion importantly depend on the ﬁscal policy rules relating to unemployment compensation and
wage taxation. Our base case scenario keeps unemployment beneﬁts and the wage tax allowance
constant in real terms and thereby installs some degree of wage rigidity. Trade integration of
the kind implied by EU enlargement is expansionary and, by raising the capital intensity of
production, boosts the marginal productivity of labor. With constant unemployment beneﬁts,
job values increase by more than wages, leading ﬁrms to post more vacancies. As labor markets
become tight, unemployment declines. In a situation where the economy suﬀers from exces-
sive bargaining power of workers or is stuck with high unemployment beneﬁts, resulting in high
wages and unemployment, integration yields further welfare gains, over and above the traditional
ones, by stimulating employment. We also found that the expansionary eﬀects of enlargement
in Germany yield a remarkable ﬁscal dividend that could be used to cut the wage tax, despite
of the need to ﬁnance higher net contributions to the EU. This reinforces the reduction in the
unemployment rate.
Our numerical model tells us that, in quantitative terms, the labor market eﬀects of trade
integration are rather modest compared to those of immigration. We look at a scenario, based
on econometric projections of migration from CEECs to EU15 countries, which features a con-
centration of immigration of low-skilled labor. Our numerical results reveal that low-skilled
workers will ﬁnd both their wages and employment prospects directly impaired by an inﬂow of
low-skilled workers, while the high-skilled gain on both accounts. Interestingly, the same does
26not hold true for immigration of high-skilled which is also included in our scenario, albeit on a
lower level. Both types of labor experience a lower level of unemployment, while at the same
time enjoying a higher wage rate. In addition to these direct labor market eﬀects, we have
also provided an empirical estimate of the so-called “immigration surplus” that is implied by
projected migration ﬂows.
Broadening our focus to the other EU15 countries, we have been able to highlight and to
gauge empirically the conﬂict of interest between present member countries which one can sense
also from policy discussions and the regular summits. Countries are diﬀerent in all relevant
dimensions: trade integration, the ﬁscal burden, and immigration. While it seems clear that
enlargement as such is not endangered by such diﬀerences, an open discussion of these issues,
based on likely numerical magnitudes as presented in this paper, should improve the prospects
for a smooth management of the enlargement process.
Appendix: An Analytical Perspective
A.1 The Model
To state the intuition given in section 3 more rigorously, the appendix states the model in more
detail and provides some analytical comparative static results.24 Since other aspects of the
model have been analyzed in more detail in Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996a,b), we focus on the
analysis of equilibrium search unemployment. In line with the empirical evidence by Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992), a large part of the labor market literature emphasizes job creation and job
destruction as a principal source of unemployment. The core theory along these lines are the
models of search-unemployment pioneered by Diamond (1982), Pissarides (1990), Hosios (1990)
and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) [see Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) for a survey]. The
trade literature has largely neglected the analysis of integration and search-generated unem-
ployment. The few exceptions neglect the role of investment as a prime transmission channel
through which integration can aﬀect unemployment.25 This paper in fact argues that integra-
tion aﬀects unemployment mainly by stimulating investment. It has proved diﬃcult, however,
to integrate the theory of search-unemployment with meaningful models of savings and invest-
ment. When individual unemployment spells are stochastic, agents become heterogeneous with
24See Heijdra and Keuschnigg (2000) for more details, including individual optimization and aggregation of the
household sector, as well as an analysis of labor market eﬃciency.
25Matusz (1996), Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) and Jansen and Turrini (2000) discuss trade in search
and eﬃciency wage models without capital.
27respect to their past unemployment and savings history. In the absence of a tractable aggre-
gation procedure, an income pooling assumption is unavoidable. The literature on growth and
unemployment [e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1994)] and on real business cycles [e.g. Andolfatto
(1996), Merz (1999), Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (1997), and Shi and Wen (1997, 1999)]
adopts such an assumption of perfect insurance and income pooling within the extended family.
A.2 Households
Individual Dynasties: We extend an overlapping generations (OLG) model pioneered by
Blanchard (1985) by incorporating search-unemployment and immigration. At each instant of
time, a large number of identical “families” or “dynasties” is born. A dynasty faces an age
independent probability of extinction. The number of new dynasties is exactly matched by the
number of deaths to keep the population constant. The population may increase as a result of
immigration, however. A dynasty counts a mass one of members who pool income to insure
against individual labor income risk, making household income non-stochastic.26 Members care




Φ(Cv,t)e−(ρ+β)tdt, Φ0 > 0 > Φ00, (A.1)
where β is the instantaneous probability of death, ρ i st h ep u r er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n dCv,t
is consumption of a composite good including domestic and foreign commodities. In maximiz-
ing life-time utility, dynasties optimally postpone consumption and save out of current income
whenever the real interest exceeds the pure rate of time preference.
Average labor income reﬂects the dynasty’s unemployment experience. Its individual mem-
bers continuously switch between states of employment and unemployment, giving Lv,t employed
and Uv,t unemployed, Uv,t + Lv,t =1at each instant. Idiosyncratic shocks destroy a constant
proportion of the pre-existing matches between ﬁrms and workers. Part of the employed loose
their jobs while unemployed agents ﬁnd employment. Given a matching rate ft,e q u a lt ot h e
fraction of unemployed individuals ﬁnding a job, an exogenous job destruction rate s,27 and
deﬁning ˙ Lv,t ≡ dLv,t/dt, the stock of employed agents follows ˙ Lv,t ≡ ftUv,t − sLv,t.W o r k e r s
earn net wages W∗









26See Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1999), Galí (1996), Den Haan et al.(1997), and Shi and Wen (1997,1999).
27At the cost of further complexity, we could make the job destruction rate endogenous as in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994, 1999). While none of the qualitative results hinge on this, the eﬀects on unemployment would
be magniﬁed, see also Jansen and Turrini (2000).
28where Wt is the gross real wage and tL is the marginal wage tax rate. The wage tax is indirectly
progressive on account of a basic tax credit of BL
t . An employed agent runs up a tax liability of
tLWt −BL
t . Since unemployed members receive beneﬁts smaller than net wages, they erode the
dynasty’s average labor income and are, therefore, sent to search for a job. The asset values of
employed and unemployed members, vL
t and vU
t ,r e ﬂect expected future income and are deﬁned
by the no-arbitrage conditions





















The real interest rate r is constant throughout this section and r + β denotes the risk adjusted
discount rate of households. The valuation of an employed agent corresponds to the present
value of the ‘job dividend’ including the net wage W∗ plus the expected capital gains ˙ vL
t of






s of loosing the job. The average
human wealth of the dynasty is Hv,t = Lv,tvL
t + Uv,tvU
t . Higher unemployment subtracts from
average human wealth. The dynasty thus attaches a diﬀerential value vL
t − vU
t to an additional
member switching from search to employment. The job dividend reﬂects the excess of the after-








which is the unemployment
beneﬁt plus the expected gain from ﬁnding employment somewhere else.
Aggregate Household Sector: At each instant, a number Nt,t of new dynasties arrive while
mortality eliminates a fraction β of them. The population thus evolves as ˙ Nt = Nt,t−βNt.W i t h
constant population, births must balance with deaths, Nt,t = βNt. Frequencies and probabilities
coincide when numbers are large. Since mortality is constant among all groups, the cohort size
of generation v at time t is Nv,t ≡ Nv,veβ(v−t) (t ≥ v). Adding up gives a total population of
Nt ≡
R t
−∞ Nv,tdv. Assuming that new dynasties are born bare of any assets (At,t =0 ), we ﬁrst
aggregate individual savings,28
˙ At ≡ rAt + W∗
t Lt + BU
t Ut + TtNt − Ct, (A.4)
where Tt is a lump-sum transfer per capita, or tax if it is negative. These variables are deﬁned
in real terms, i.e. in units of the composite good.
Assuming that new dynasties start life without jobs (Ut,t =1and Lt,t =0 ), individual job
28Individual and aggregate variables are linked as xt ≡
R t
−∞ xv,tNv,ve
β(v−t)dv. Note that individual savings
earn an annuity rate of interest r + β which reﬂects the existence of a reverse life-insurance, paying a premium
βA during life-time but collecting the remaining assets upon death. From an aggregate perspective, this simply
reﬂects a transfer of wealth upon death of old agents to currently living generations and thus cancels.
29accumulation implies aggregate labor market ﬂows
˙ Lt = ftUt − (s + β)Lt, ˙ Ut = Nt,t + sLt − (ft + β)Ut. (A.5)
Using Lt +Ut = Nt and ˙ Nt = Nt,t −βNt, unemployment dynamics just mirrors the evolution of
employment. Employment expands as unemployed workers ﬁnd jobs, and it falls either because
jobs are destroyed (at rate s) or workers die (at rate β). The ﬂow into unemployment results
from the arrival of new dynasties and the destruction of existing jobs, whereas the ﬂow out of
unemployment consists of workers ﬁnding a job or dying. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that population size is unity prior to an immigration shock (Nt =1 ). In the absence of
migration, levels and rates of (un-)employment thus coincide.
A.3 Firms
Investment Firms: Production rests on two types of ﬁrms. Investment ﬁrms accumulate
physical capital while production ﬁrms use labor and rent capital services to produce goods.
The investment ﬁrm purchases It units of the composite good and builds up a stock of capital
Kt subject to ˙ Kt = It−δKt,w h e r eδ is the depreciation rate. The ﬁrm’s objective is the present
value of cash ﬂows (1 − tK)RtKt − It where tK is a source based tax on capital income and
Rt is the real rental rate, measured in units of the composite good. In equilibrium, investment
equates the marginal value product net of taxes with the user cost of capital:
¡
1 − tK¢
Rt = r + δ. (A.6)
Production Firms: Following Pissarides (2000), we assume ﬁrms to be large enough so that
employment risk washes out over the ﬁrm’s total labor force even though hiring of and separation
from individual workers is stochastic. The ﬁrm loses a proportion of its workforce either due to
idiosyncratic shocks or death of agents. To augment its labor force, it must post vacancies V ,
˙ Lt = qtVt − (s + β)Lt, (A.7)
where qt is the instantaneous probability of successful hiring. Each vacancy requires a labor input
of κ for search activities. To ﬁnd new workers, the ﬁrm must thus divert part of its workforce
to search and recruitment activities. Using a linearly homogeneous production technology, the







t = Lt − κVt. (A.8)
The ﬁrm’s real cash ﬂow is
¡
1 − tK¢¡
phY/P − RK − WL
¢
.T h eﬁrm chooses time paths for
output, capital, vacancies and employment in order to maximize the present value of its cash
30ﬂow subject to (A.7-8), taking as given its initial labor force. Optimal ﬁrm behavior is
(a) Rt = ph
t FK/Pt,
(b) µL
















Capital is rented until its marginal value product is equal to its rental rate. According to (A9.b),
the ﬁrm posts new vacancies until the marginal cost of recruitment in terms of foregone output
equals the expected value of a vacancy. The value of a ﬁlled job in (A9.c) is the expected present
value of the rent which the ﬁrm earns on that job. The instantaneous discount rate reﬂects the
risk of job termination due to death, β, and separation for other reasons, s.
A.4 Wage Bargaining
Vacancies and workers on job search participate in an anonymous matching process. The number
of matches Xt at each instant of time is a function of the number of agents searching on both
sides of the market, speciﬁed as Xt = x0U²
tV 1−²
t . The fraction of unemployed agents ﬁnding a
job is f (θt) ≡ Xt/Ut, and the fraction of vacancies ﬁlled is q(θt) ≡ Xt/Vt where θt ≡ Vt/Ut is
labor market tightness. The transition rates satisfy
f (θt)=θtq(θt),f 0 (θt) > 0 >f 00 (θt),q 0 (θt) < 0 <q 00 (θt). (A.10)
Given the speciﬁcation of the matching function, the elasticities ² ≡− θq0(θ)/q(θ) and 1 − ² =
θf0(θ)/f(θ) are constant and lie in the unit interval.
Following Pissarides (2000), we assume that the two parties share the job rent created by a
new match according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. When they agree on a higher
wage, the job value to the worker as implied by (A.3), vL
t − vU
t , rises while the job value to
the ﬁrm (A9.c) falls. The i-th worker-ﬁrm pair divides the job surplus by agreeing on a wage
Wt =a r g m a x
£
vL





¤1−ζ,w h e r eζ and 1 − ζ are the bargaining weights of































The wage is a weighted average of the job surplus net of the wage tax and the worker’s reservation
rate [less the employment subsidy]. The reservation rate is the unemployment beneﬁtp l u s
the expected gain from ﬁnding a job elsewhere. With a larger bargaining power, the worker
appropriates more of the surplus. Using the bargaining solution again, we obtain:








1 − tL + ζ ·
ftµL
t
1 − tK . (A.11)
31A.5 Equilibrium
In the absence of public debt, the government budget identity is given by:
TtNt + BU









t Yt/Pt − WtLt
´
, (A.12)
where TE represents net contributions to the European Union (EU). Revenues stem from a
dual (capital and labor) income tax, and are spent on unemployment beneﬁts, transfers to the
household sector and net EU contributions.29
Savings are invested in three perfectly substitutable assets, i.e. shares of production and
investment ﬁr m sa sw e l la sn e tf o r e i g na s s e t sAF. Equilibrium requires that household sector
wealth equals the real value of all outstanding assets. From the corresponding ﬂow identities,










The term in brackets is the trade balance which is domestic real income less absorption. Re-
placing I by ˙ K +δK and integrating by parts, we can derive the present value of consumption,
R ∞
0 Cte−rtdt = AF







t Yt/Pt − (r + δ)Kt
i
e−rtdt. (A.14)
Net contributions, in real terms, amount to TE = tEphY/P where tE is the net contribution rate.
Given a constant real interest rate, and ignoring issues of intergenerational redistribution, we
can take the present value of domestic consumption as our aggregate welfare measure. Welfare
changes along with Λ∗ since K0 + AF
0 is predetermined.
A.6 Comparative Statics
Capital Intensity: Removing trade barriers squeezes import prices pm =( 1 + τ)¯ pm and
thereby favorably aﬀect the price index. Indicating percentage changes by a hat, ˆ ph = dph/ph,
ˆ τ = dτ/(1 + τ), trade costs and output prices feed into the price index as
ˆ P =( 1− γ)ˆ ph + γˆ τ, (A.15)







phFL/P to denote real rental rates net of taxes. By (A.6) and (A.9a), RK =
29The simulation model also includes tariﬀ revenues plus more taxes, spending items and public debt.
32r + δ. Investment incentives are strengthened on two fronts: higher prices of home goods
ph and lower import barriers. The capital labor ratio k = K/(L − κv) thus increases by30
ˆ k =
¡
ˆ ph − ˆ τ
¢
γσK/(1 − α). The net real job surplus, in turn, increases along with higher capital
intensity:
ˆ RL =ˆ ph + ˆ FL − ˆ P =
³
ˆ ph − ˆ τ
´
γ/(1 − α). (A.16)
Labor Market Tightness: With the capital labor ratio and, thus, the net rental price of labor
ﬁxed, the wage equation (A.11), the free entry condition (A.9b) and the asset price equation
(A.9c) solve for the value of a ﬁlled job µL, the labor market tightness θ, and the wage rate
W independently of the levels of employment and capital. This implies that the asset price
instantaneously jumps to its stationary value, implying ˙ µL =0at all dates. We can state31
Proposition 1 Labor market tightness increases when unemployment beneﬁts BU and tax al-
lowance BL are kept constant in real terms, with BU >B L.
Proof. The asset price capitalizes net producer rents according to the stationary ver-
sion of (A.9c), (r + β + s)µL = RL −
¡
1 − tY ¢
W. Substituting the wage equation in (A.11),
¡
1 − tY ¢




[r + β + s + ζf (θ)]µL =( 1− ζ)
¡
RL + BL − BU¢
. (a)
This and (A.9b), µLq(θ)=κRL, simultaneously determine θ and µL. Log-linearization yields
(r + β + s + ζf)µLˆ µL + ζµLf ˆ f =( 1− ζ)RL ˆ RL.U s e( a )t oo b t a i n
(r + β + s + ζf)µL
³
ˆ µL − ˆ RL
´
+ ζµLf ˆ f =( 1− ζ)
¡
BU − BL¢ ˆ RL. (b)
With ˆ f =( 1− ²)ˆ θ from (A.10) and ˆ µL − ˆ RL = ²ˆ θ from (A.9b), we have
ˆ θ =
(1 − ζ)(BU − BL)
[(r + β + s)² + ζf]µL
ˆ RL. (A.17)
Labor market tightness increases with a higher rental price RL as in (A.16).
We emphasize the case of constant real beneﬁts BL and BU. Heijdra and Keuschnigg (2000)
show, however, that labor market equilibrium depends on the speciﬁc ﬁscal policy rules in place.
30The elasticity of substitution in production is σ
K = −(1 − α)f
0/(kf
00) and capital’s share in value added is
α = kf
0/f where f(k) denotes the production function in intensive form.




We continue to assume that the basic tax allowance applies only to wage income.
33Fiscal policy is important because it aﬀects wage formation which determines producer rents
and incentives to post vacancies. If beneﬁts were indexed to net wages, BU = bU ¡
1 − tY ¢
W
and BL = bL ¡
1 − tY ¢
W, net wages, producer rents and asset price of ﬁlled jobs would all
increase proportionately. As the expected value of posting a vacancy would rise by the same
amount as the ﬁrm’s search cost, there would be no reason to revise recruitment. Another case
is progressive wage taxation with unemployment beneﬁts indexed, BU = bU ¡
1 − tY ¢
W, but
real tax allowance BL constant. In this case, wages would increase relatively more than rental
costs, leave smaller producer rents, and contribute to weaker market tightness.
Employment Dynamics: Unemployment falls when labor markets become tighter. While θ
jumps instantaneously to its steady state value, the reduction in unemployment is gradual as in
(A.5) with an adjustment speed equal to β + s + f. Log-linearization yields
·
ˆ Ut = −(1 − ²)f · ˆ θ − (β + s + f) ˆ Ut, (A.18)
where ˆ U ≡ dU/U and
·
ˆ U ≡ d ˙ U/U.S t a r t i n g w i t h ˆ U0 =0and noting ˆ θ from (A.17), the
transitional solution is:




, ˆ U∞ = −
(1 − ²)f
β + s + f
ˆ θ. (A.19)
Since the vacancy ratio jumps up instantaneously, labor use in production, LD = L − κV ,
ﬁrst declines and picks up only afterwards as ﬁrms build up their labor force. Taking the solution









β + s + f
· ˆ θ, (A.20)
where χ ≡ (1 + κθ)(1− ²)f − κθ(β + s + f). Employment in production thus follows
ˆ LD








With productive employment determined and the eﬀect on the capital labor ratio noted prior
to (A.16), we derive an output response





ˆ ph − ˆ τ
´
> 0. (A.22)
Productive employment ﬁrst falls as ﬁrms allocate more labor to recruitment activities. Since the
capital labor ratio picks up instantaneously, the output response is ambiguous in the short-run.
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Since recruitment absorbs part of the labor force, employment in production is only LD = L−κV
and changes according to ˆ LD
t = −
h
(1 + κθ) ˆ Ut + κθˆ θ
i
U/LD. Using (A.6) together with (A.9a)
and (A.15), we obtain
ˆ Λ∗ = γ
³
ˆ ph − ˆ τ
´




(1 − α) ˆ LD
t +
tK − tE
1 − tE α ˆ Kt
¸
e−rtdt, (A.24)
where ˆ tE = tE/
¡
1 − tE¢
deﬁnes the relative change in the net contribution rate. The expression
captures the major sources of the gains from integration: First, welfare improves upon better
terms of trade and lower real trade costs.32 Second, the home country directly loses from
ah i g h e rnet contribution rate to the EU budget. Third, welfare potentially improves upon
more employment being allocated to production. And fourth, the country gains from induced
investment to the extent that it is suppressed initially by a distorting capital income tax.33 Note
that, for any given capital labor ratio, investment must pick up to accommodate employment
gains, ˆ Kt = ˆ k+ ˆ LD
t . With respect to the welfare implications of labor market tightness, we state
Proposition 2 Welfare increases with labor market tightness if (a) the workers’ bargaining
power exceeds the elasticity of matching with respect to job searchers, ζ >² , and (b) unemploy-
ment beneﬁts exceed the employment subsidy, BU >B L.
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r + β + s + f
ˆ θ. (A.25)
Divide (a) in proposition 1 by RL,u s eµLq = κRL from (A.9b) and multiply by f = θq to get
(r + β + s)κθ + ζκθf =( 1− ζ)f − (1 − ζ)f ·
¡
BU − BL¢
/RL. Using this and the deﬁnition of















32The simulation model also captures the loss in tariﬀ revenue that results from the Europe agreements.
33The simulation model allows for monopolistic competition and markup pricing of specialized capital goods.
For this reason, capital accumulation is too low from a social perspective, and investment stimulation yields ﬁrst
order welfare gains even without tax distortions.
35which shows the conditions for welfare gains to be positive.
Although tighter labor markets raise welfare on account of lower unemployment, they also
lead to welfare losses by raising ﬁrms’ search-costs, making the net welfare eﬀects ambiguous.
Hosios (1990) has shown that equilibrium search-unemployment is eﬃcient in a an economy
without government activity (BU = BL =0 )i fζ = ². In this case, a policy induced increase
in labor market tightness has zero ﬁrst order welfare eﬀects. If the bargaining power of workers
exceeds the matching elasticity, bargaining results in too high wages, insuﬃcient job creation
and, consequently, excessive unemployment. Unemployment beneﬁts further exacerbate the
problem since they also boost wages and retard job creation. Under these circumstances, any
shock that stimulates employment promises ﬁrst order welfare gains.
Immigration: We consider two immigration scenarios. In this subsection we conﬁne to the
stock scenario and assume that immigration augments all age cohorts by the same factor such
that the total population Nt ≡
R t
−∞ Nv,tdv remains stationary. At each instant, a number of
new agents Nt,t = βNt arrives that keeps total population constant. There are now transitional
eﬀects on the demographic structure. In an alternative ﬂow scenario, location choice is restricted
to new agents implying that immigration is concentrated among the young only. A permanently
larger share of newborns worldwide locate in the home country while old agents remain locked
in their country of birth. Thus, the number Nt,t of new arrivals or young workers in present
EU member countries is permanently higher and leads to a gradual increase in the domestic
population by ˙ Nt = Nt,t − βNt until the stock converges to N = Nt,t/β. There will be long-
lasting transitional eﬀects on aggregate labor supply. The simulation section will compare the
transitional eﬀects of the two scenarios. In all cases, we assume that migrants arrive bare of any
ﬁnancial assets.
In the small open economy, the capital labor ratio depends exclusively on real interest and
prices as ﬁxed on international markets. Factor rentals thus remain constant and wage formation
is not disturbed. According to (A.17), immigration does not aﬀect labor market tightness. The
increased population splits between employed and unemployed agents, N = L + U. According
to (A.5), the number of unemployed converges to U = N (β + s)/(β + s + f),l e a v i n gt h el o n g -
run unemployment rate U/N unaﬀected. Immigration increases the number of employed and
unemployed agents, the number of vacancies, labor input in production, capital stock and output
all proportionately without eﬀect on the capital-labor and vacancy-unemployment ratios. With
the stock scenario of immigration, the number of new and old workers increases in proportion,
keeping the age structure constant. Immigration nevertheless holds important transitional eﬀects
on labor markets since the dN migrants ﬁnd work only after a search period. With L0 being
predetermined, immigration thus raises the number of job searchers instantaneously by dU0 =
36dN,i m p l y i n gˆ U0 = ˆ N/U and a short-run overshooting of the unemployment rate of ˆ U0 − ˆ N =
ˆ N (1 − U)/U.
These arguments miss out on a basic channel that works to reduce unemployment. The
simulation model features a monopolistically competitive production sector with product dif-
ferentiation due to free entry of specialized ﬁrms. As immigration swells the labor force and
induces investment to keep capital intensity constant, output expands proportionately, at least
in the long-run. With the scale of individual ﬁrms ﬁxed, output comes in the form of additional
product varieties giving rise to increasing returns due to specialization. The variety eﬀect re-
duces the price index for the composite capital good which raises capital intensity and the rental
rate of labor. If unemployment beneﬁts are kept constant in real terms, labor market tightness
increases and unemployment falls.
Proposition 3 In a small open economy, immigration does not aﬀect the capital labor and
vacancy unemployment ratios. It raises short-run unemployment but leaves the long-run unem-
ployment rate unaﬀected. If production is subject to increasing returns due to specialization, the
output gains from immigration boost investment and labor rentals and thereby reduce long-run
unemployment rates if real beneﬁts are kept constant.
A.7 The Computational Model
Further Details of the Model: This paper diﬀers from Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996, 2002)
by allowing for search unemployment but shares other model elements. We repeat only the most
important features that add to the core elements introduced in this appendix. Production oc-
curs in twelve sectors that are connected by interindustry shipments of intermediate goods. Free
entry subject to a zero proﬁt condition determines the equilibrium number of ﬁrms and diﬀeren-
tiated goods within each sector, giving rise to increasing returns due to specialization. Demand
stems from Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) preferences, i.e. diﬀerent brands are imperfectly substitutable.
The composition of investment, government and export demand similarly reﬂects allocation of
expenditure across diﬀerentiated, sectoral commodities. On the supply side, investment is sub-
ject to installation costs, making transitional dynamics more realistic. Employment and capital
stocks are accumulated separately in each sector. Labor supply and demand distinguish high
and low skilled labor with job matching taking place in two segmented markets.
The model is calibrated to 1996 benchmark data of the German economy. We select certain
taste and technology parameters from the econometrics literature and also draw on parameters
commonly used in the real business cycle literature [see Andolfatto (1996), Burda and Weder
(1998), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) etc.]. Other parameters are calibrated such that the
stationary solution reproduces the benchmark data set. The model is implemented quarterly to
37get meaningful lengths of unemployment spells. In the stationary state, unemployment rates of
high and low skilled workers are set at 6 and 10 percent, respectively. Unemployment beneﬁts
amount to 70 percent of net wages. The bargaining power ζ i ss e ta t. 5f o rb o t hs k i l lt y p e s ,
and the matching elasticity ² with respect to the unemployed at .4 [see Broersma and Van
Ours (1999) for a survey]. In line with the empirical literature on search-unemployment, and
drawing on German evidence by Schmidt (1999), we set the transition rates such that average
unemployment duration 1/f of high (low) skilled labor is 1.75 (3) quarters. Vacancy duration
1/q is 1.4 (1.3) quarters. Together with a quarterly mortality rate of β =1 /60,34 these values
then imply a quarterly split rate s to replicate the labor market equilibrium. The calibrated
value implies a job duration of about 27 quarters for both skill types. Calibration generates a
search-coeﬃcient κ such that roughly two (three) percent of the skilled (unskilled) labor force
is absorbed in recruitment. Calibration of the rest of the model is standard and not repeated.
A.8 Migration Scenario
The data underlying our migration scenario are taken from projections presented by the Eu-
ropean Integration Consortium (EIC) (2001). These are based on a time-series model which
explains the change in the stock of foreign residents relative to the home population by changes
in German wages relative to foreign wages, as well as changes in the unemployment rates in
Germany and the foreign country, respectively. The model allows projections for the number of
people from CEECs10 living in Germany in the years up to 2030. These projections have then
been extended to other EU15-countries, based on how the migrants from the CEECs10 that
have lived in the EU15 in 1998 were distributed across EU15-countries. Extrapolation leads
to an estimated increase in the number or CEECs10 migrants living in the EU15, from some
850 thousand in 1998 to roughly 3.9 Mio people in 2030 (EIC, Part A, Table 7.11). The corre-
sponding numbers for Germany are 550 thousand and 2.5 Mio, respectively. We take diﬀerences
in estimated stocks to obtain net migration ﬂows and follow EIC in assuming that 35 percent
of that ﬂow will enter the labor market (EIC, p. 101). Since our model distinguishes between
skilled and unskilled labor, we have to do the same with migration inﬂows. Evidence produced
by EIC (Part A, Table 5.6) indicates that roughly 40 percent of the people from CEECs em-
ployed in the EU in 1995 had a formal education level corresponding to secondary education
(2nd stage), or higher. We therefore assume that 40 percent of the people migrating from east
to west will fall into our category of skilled labor. This gives us two separate ﬂows of migrants
34An expected life-time of 15 years or 60 quarters may seem rather low. This parameter is not to be interpreted
literally, however, since it applies equally to both young and old generations. It rather reﬂects disconnectedness
of dynasties and discounting of future wage incomes.
38entering EU15-countries’ labor markets for skilled and unskilled labor. In a last step, we relate
these inﬂows to the initial stocks which we calculate using labor force data from EIC (Part A,
Table 3.2), and an index of formal schooling for each EU15-country. More speciﬁcally, Lj is the
labor force of EU15-country j and Sj is that country’s formal schooling index. Then country
j’s unskilled labor force is calculated as Lj ×(SG/Sj)/uG,w h e r euG is the the ratio of unskilled
labor in the calibrated German CGE model.35 The resulting rate of increase in the German
labor force is 6.15 percent for unskilled and 0.84 percent of skilled labor, respectively.
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42Table 1: Eastern Enlargement: Policy Decomposition
Policy Elements OLD NEW
I: Trade Integration
A) Europe Agreements:
(a) German (EU) non-agricultural tariﬀs removed CEEC5: 6.3% 0%
vis-à-vis CEEC10 CEEC10: 7.6% 0%
(b) CEEC10 countries non-agricultural CEEC5: 6.7% 0%
tariﬀs removed vis-à -vis Germany CEEC10: 11.% 0%
B) Enlargement to CEEC5 countries
B.I. Single Market:
(a) German tariﬀs on farm products removed 12.2% 0%
(b) CEEC1 tariﬀs on farm products removed 9.8% 0%
(c) internal market: reduction of real trade costs 5.0% 0%
B.II. Repercussions from extending CAP:
(a) higher prices for farm imports from CEEC5 by 0.61%
(b) lower subsidies for farm exports to CEEC5 8.5% 0%
(c) lower world prices for farm products by 2%
I I :F i s c a lB u r d e n
higher net contribution rate (% of GDP) 0.595% 0.665%
III: Immigration of Low-skilled Labor
long run increase in stock of low-skilled labor by 6.15%
IV: Immigration of Skilled Labor
long run increase in stock of skilled labor by 0.8%
43Table 2: Long-Run Eﬀects on the German Economy
Variables, changes in pc.* Trade Fiscal Enl Low High Migr**
P consumer price index -0.267 -0.033 -0.310 -0.069 -0.146 -0.214
PI investment price index -0.256 -0.042 -0.164 -0.115 -0.148 -0.262
¯ p dom. producer prices 0.047 -0.042 0.036 0.049 -0.023 0.027
¯ pE terms of trade w.CEECs 7.113 -0.043 7.131 -0.091 -0.070 -0.161
EE exports to CEECs 57.350 0.188 57.392 1.043 0.806 1.861
E total exports 4.122 0.185 4.015 0.915 0.781 1.706
Us skilled unempl.rate, 6 %* 5.944 6.001 5.935 5.912 5.977 5.890
Uu unsk.unempl.rate, 10 %* 9.937 10.000 9.903 10.544 9.879 10.402
U av.unempl.rate, 6.668 %* 6.611 6.669 6.598 6.726 6.625 6.677
K
P
j capital stocks 0.524 -0.019 0.630 1.330 1.164 2.513
¯ n number of ﬁrms 0.581 0.003 0.666 1.192 1.057 2.267
Y gross domestic production 0.402 -0.058 0.376 0.988 0.826 1.824
ws wage rate, skilled 0.522 -0.049 0.602 1.174 0.171 1.353
wu wage rate, unskilled 0.286 -0.035 0.545 -4.251 0.921 -3.389
z government transfers 1.167 -0.370 0.516 2.358 2.090 4.486
ω average disposable income 0.796 -0.201 0.536 1.771 1.511 3.308
C average consumption 1.065 -0.169 0.847 1.842 1.660 3.531
EV aggr.welfare, % of GDP 0.554 -0.091 0.450 0.357 0.335 0.692
Notes: Trade: Trade and CAP. Fiscal: Fiscal Cost. Enl: EU Enlargement. Low: Im-
migration of low-skilled. High: Immigration of high-skilled. Migr: Total Immigration.
Ab a r( e . g .¯ p) denotes weighted averages of sectoral values. *) Labor market variables
in absolute terms, initial values starred. **) Welfare change relates to ﬂow scenario
while EV = 0.948 for the stock scenario.
44Table 3: Alternative Fiscal Policy Assumptions
Variables, changes in pc.* Enl Index IndBU E/Tax M/Tax
P consumer price index -0.310 -0.299 -0.305 -0.323 -0.276
PI investment price index -0.164 -0.152 -0.152 -0.178 -0.331
¯ p dom. producer prices 0.036 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.013
¯ pE terms of trade w.CEECs 7.131 7.138 7.138 7.122 -0.203
EE exports to CEECs 57.392 57.280 57.289 57.517 2.275
E total exports 4.015 3.945 3.951 4.095 2.100
Us skilled unempl.rate, 6 %* 5.935 6.000 6.016 5.861 5.544
Uu unsk.unempl.rate, 10 %* 9.903 10.000 10.028 9.790 9.770
U av.unempl.rate, 6.668 %* 6.598 6.668 6.686 6.518 6.281
K
P
j capital stocks 0.630 0.540 0.554 0.733 3.019
¯ n number of ﬁrms 0.666 0.583 0.598 0.759 2.730
Y gross domestic product 0.376 0.313 0.323 0.448 2.173
ws wage rate, skilled 0.602 0.594 0.632 0.612 1.410
wu wage rate, unskilled 0.545 0.579 0.638 0.503 -3.685
z government transfers 0.516 0.238 0.462 -0.323 -0.276
ω average dispos.income 0.536 0.422 0.442 0.667 3.942
C average consumption 0.847 0.723 0.749 0.988 4.210
EV aggr.welfare, % of GDP 0.450 0.384 0.395 0.519 0.693
Notes: Enl: Real BU and BL constant. Index: BU and BL both indexed.
IndBU: BU indexed, real BL constant. E/Tax: Real BU, BL and z constant,
wage tax endogenous. M/Tax: Total immigration, wage tax cut. A bar (e.g.
¯ p) denotes weighted averages of sectoral values. *) Labor market variables in
absolute terms, initial values starred.
45Trade Fiscal Welfare
shares burden unskilled skilled effect
Austria 0.662 0.071 10.526 1.444 2.017
Belgium (#) 0.230 0.225 1.419 0.144 0.166
Denmark 0.276 0.070 1.481 0.182 0.452
Finland 0.454 0.135 2.543 0.268 0.711
France 0.103 0.076 0.390 0.049 0.086
Germany 0.397 0.070 6.152 0.840 1.154
Greece 0.084 0.756 1.858 0.274 -0.655
Ireland 0.167 0.684 0.052 0.007 -0.657
Italy 0.187 0.100 0.609 0.089 0.201
Luxembourg (#) 0.230 0.189 2.121 0.215 0.282
Netherlands 0.271 0.072 0.682 0.079 0.355
Protugal 0.032 1.025 0.072 0.010 -1.289
Spain 0.057 0.409 0.312 0.037 -0.423
Sweden 0.235 0.055 3.217 0.349 0.581
UK 0.090 0.068 0.689 0.077 0.107
Elasticity 1.394 -1.309 0.058 0.399
Immigration
Table 4: Enlargement Scenario for EU15 Countries
Overall Welfare Effect in % of GDP
Welfare effect: Annual welfare gain in percent of GDP, calculated as sums of the elasticities 
multiplied the "shocks".
Trade shares: Country-specific measures of the size of the "shock" from commodity market 
integration (corresponding to scenario I in table 1, and column 1 in table 2); see text for more 
details.
Fiscal burden: Estimates of the cost of enlargement from the EU-budget in percent of GDP 
(corresponding to scenatio II in table 1, and column 2 of table 2).
(#) Estimates from the scenario of increasing own resources. In all other cases estimates from 
the scenario of reducing structural funds are used.
Legend:
Immigration: Cumulative inflows of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively, in percent 
of initial stocks (corresponding to scenarios III and IV of table 1, and columns 4 and 5 of 
table 2); see appendix A.8 for more details. 
Elasticity: Elasticity pertaining to the various enlargement "shocks" calculated from the 
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EEC-57: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy Luxembourg, Netherlands
ENL-73: Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom
ENL-81: Greece
ENL-86: Portugal, Spain
ENL-95: Austria, Finland, Sweden
ENL-CEEC5: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia
ENL-CEEC10: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak RepublicFigure 2: Trade shares and trade barriers for EU15 merchandize trade with 
CEEC10s
















1997 imports in % of GDP
weighted import tariffs
weighted non-tariff import barriers
1997 exports in % of GDP
weighted export tariffs
Source: Keuschnigg & Kohler (2000). Figure 3: Stocks of residents and employees from CEEC10s in EU15 countries

















1995 stock of CEEC10-employees in % of total employees
1999 stock of CEEC10-residents in % of residents
Source: European Integration Consortium (2001).










































































base caseFig. 5: Welfare effect of enlargement in EU15 countries, annual % of GDP
















  fiscal burden
  trade integration
  immigration
  overall welfare effect
Source: Table 4